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In defending the startling claim that that there are no artifacts, 
indeed, no inanimate material objects of the familiar sort, Peter 
van Inwagen has argued that truths about such putative objects 
can be paraphrased as truths that do not make essential reference 
to them and that we should endorse only the ontological 
commitments of the paraphrase. In this note I argue that the 
paraphrases van Inwagen recommends cannot meet his condition. 
Read one way, they lose us some truths. Read another, they entail 
the existence of the very objects they are supposed to rid us of. 
However, we need not share van Inwagen's distaste for the latter: 
to say that they exist is not to say that anything exists in addition to 
the simples composing them. !
Keywords: van Invagen, paraphrase, composites, simples !!!
As part of his argument that there are no composite objects, van Inwagen 
claims that statements appearing to assert or imply their existence, while 
allowable as true "in the ordinary business of life," are not strictly true, 
by which he means that they are not to be taken at face value when we 
are doing serious metaphysics. What are strictly true are paraphrases of 
such statements that do not make reference to anything other than the 
simples of which these putative are supposed to be composed.  If this is 1
so, one welcome - at least to van Inwagen - consequence is that hoary old  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 van Inwagen stresses that by 'paraphrase' he does not mean 'translation,' if the latter is 1
understood as preserving the meaning of, or expressing the same proposition as is 
expressed by, the original sentence (1990, 112-3). All that is required is that they describe 
all the facts without essential reference to composites (1990, 113 et pass). The problems 
with his proposal to be canvassed in this note arise even if we understand paraphrase as he 
does.
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puzzles about their identity cannot as much as arise. For example, we can 
re-tell the Theseus story in terms of planks ("honorary simples," that is, 
simples relative to the putative ship they are thought to compose) 
"arranged ship-wise," without mentioning ships. Even though in the re-
told story there are no ships, nothing philosophically important is left out 
(1990, 128-9). Furthermore, we do not have to deny that the ordinary, 
non-philosophical, description of the facts is true. Even though there are 
no ships, sentences ordinarily taken to be true about them can be allowed 
to be literally, if not strictly, true, albeit "perhaps…in some sense… 
misleading" (1990, 101). 
In this paper I challenge van Inwagen's claim that his paraphrases 
"preserve everything" that is true of the thing, event or state of affairs 
described in the original, everyday, statement (1990, 129, van Inwagen's 
emphasis). I argue that the locution on which the paraphrases rely – 
'simples arranged x-wise' – cannot be understood as referring either to the 
simples taken severally on pain of losing some truths or to their 
arrangement on pain of readmitting xs into our ontology. 
In van Inwagen's metaphysically serious version of the story, what we 
have before the first plank is replaced is what he calls the First Planks. 
After one of these is replaced, we have the Second Planks, after one of 
those – one that had been one of the First Planks as well as one of the 
Second Planks – is replaced, we have the Third Planks, and so on. When 
each plank that had been one of the First Planks has been replaced, the 
First Planks are re-arranged in exactly the same way they were at the 
beginning of the story. The First Planks and the Last Planks are clearly 
not identical, since there is a plank that is one of the Second Planks and 
not one of the First Planks – and, again, so on. Since there is no mention 
of any ship, "there is no such question as 'Which of the two ships existing 
at the end of the story is the ship with which the story began?'" (1990, 
129). In general, "If there are no artifacts, then there are no philosophical 
problems about artifacts" such as those that have exercised philosophers 
for millennia. 
The viability of eliminating apparent reference to artifacts by paraphrase 
has not gone unquestioned. Rosenberg, for example, suggests that "…the 
notion of simples 'being arranged chairwise' is one that we can and do 
understand only to the extent that we understand references to ships per 
se" (702). Elder voices a similar misgiving: "…allowing that dogwise 
arrangement obtains at all is allowing that there are dogs" (132). 
One may also wonder how 'This is a ship' can be literally true in any, 
even in a "loose", everyday, sense if it is not true in the strict sense. van 
Inwagen asks us to imagine Copernicus saying "According to my theory, 
the sun does not move. Nevertheless, sentences like 'It was cooler in the 
garden after the sun had moved behind the elms' can, when uttered in the 
course of the ordinary business of life, express truths" (1993, 684-685).  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If we take Copernicus to be saying that, strictly speaking, the sun does 
not move, it is not clear what we are to take him to be saying when he 
says that the quotidian sentence expresses a truth. Hirsch makes the 
related complaint that he does not understand what van Inwagen means 
when he says that there are, strictly speaking, no apples (690-691). In 
saying this, is he speaking strictly or not? Is Copernicus? 
Here I offer a different objection: contrary to what van Inwagen says, his 
proposed paraphrases do not preserve all the everyday truths we – and he 
– accept about artifacts such as ships. 
What can we take 'the First Planks' etc. to refer to? Suppose we take the 
plural noun in the expression at face value and treat the expression as 
having plural reference to the planks that are arranged ship-wise. These 
are van Inwagen's "honorary simples" that stand to the putative ship as do 
the true simples, whatever they are, to the planks themselves (and as 
would the relevant simples to any other putative composite material 
object). If we understand the expression in this way, the claim that 
everything true in the standard version of the story remains true in the re-
telling becomes hard to maintain. The ship is bigger than the planks – 
even when these are arranged ship-wise – but the planks, even when so 
arranged, are not bigger than the planks not so arranged. (More on this 
below.) 
Suppose, instead, that we take the capitals seriously and treat 'the First 
Planks' as a proper name, ignoring the plural. What can it be thought to 
name? The only thing in the offing is the ship-wise arrangement of planks 
we have. Trouble again: the planks of the ship, as we ordinarily say, are 
nailed to each other but the ship-wise arrangement of planks is not nailed 
to anything. In any case, arrangements of planks are just what van 
Inwagen is in the business of eschewing. It is essential to his strategy that 
whatever truths there are be truths about planks, not about arrangements 
of them. Once we let arrangements in, we may as well call them ships.  2
van Inwagen's own understanding of the expression 'the First Planks' is as 
"a rigid plural designator, like 'the British Empiricists'" (1990, 128). The 
idea is that the latter does not refer to the individual philosophers so 
grouped, nor to an additional entity, the group they form; in the same 
way, 'the First Planks' should not be taken to refer either to the individual 
planks that are arranged ship-wise or to an additional entity, the ship they  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 As Uzquiano observes, "…if propositions expressed by ordinary statements apparently 2
concerned with ordinary material objects like bricks and tables and chairs turn out to be 
propositions concerned with sets of simples under certain arrangements, then one should 
consider identifying objects like bricks and tables and chairs with sets of simples under 
certain arrangements" (446, my emphasis). Goldwater advocates precisely this. However, 
doing this is not open to van Inwagen. He cannot be seen as saying what ordinary objects 
are, given that he thinks there are none. It is one thing to be a reductionist, quite another to 
be an eliminativist. (See also fn. 6 below.)
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compose. If this is right, the properties of individual planks, including the 
property of – as we say – being nailed to other planks. are irrelevant, and 
thereby so is the fact that the First Planks lack(s?) that property. 
It is not clear that the expression 'the British Empiricists' behaves in the 
way van Inwagen claims. What exactly does 'the British Empiricists' refer 
to? Do I, when I use it, really leave behind the properties of the 
individuals? Not if I say that the British Empiricists were English, Irish, 
and Scottish, respectively: the property of being English or Irish or 
Scottish is a property of the individuals Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In a 
similar way, if I say 'the First Planks came from trees in Norway,' I must 
be taken to be referring to the individual planks. This is especially clear if 
we add that they came at different times, some in one shipment, some in 
another. Note that I could have said 'were cut from trees in Norway,' 
instead of 'came from Norway.' The plural 'were' would have made it 
clear (as 'came' does not) that the property in question – having been cut 
from a tree in Norway – is being attributed to the planks individually. Of 
course, since that is what is in question here, we should not put things in 
a way that begs the question. The point can be made, however, even if we 
use the number-neutral 'came.' The property of having come from 
Norway is as much a property of the individual planks as is the property 
of having been cut from a tree in Norway. So, too, is the property of 
being nailed to other planks. 
It may seem that the property of having come from Norway is a property 
of the planks, as much as of each plank. So, then, is the property of 
having been cut from trees in Norway, one that the planks, as well as 
individual planks possess. But it is not clear what sort of property that 
could be. How does one cut a number of planks from a number of trees, 
except by cutting individual planks (one or more) from individual trees?  3
The capital 'E' in the third word in 'the British Empiricists' signals that the 
expression refers to a particular group of philosophers, namely, the group 
comprising Locke, Berkeley and Hume.  Without it, the expression would 4
be naturally taken to refer to whatever philosophers are British and share 
a certain outlook – Mill certainly included. But a group is a single thing, a 
composite, and as such is no more acceptable to van Inwagen than is an 
arrangement. 
van Inwagen's 'rigid plural designator' hovers uneasily between the plural 
and the singular. It is worth noting that he himself insists that tertium non  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 If Smith, Brown and Jones are students in the class, each one has the property of being a 3
student in the class. Who has the property of being students in the class? Not Smith, not 
Brown, not Jones, only the trio – which is, again, one thing.
 As in the title of Johnathan Bennett's book.4
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datur. He criticizes those who think that the thesis that the whole is the 
sum of its parts can be expressed by 'A whole is its parts' precisely for 
that reason. He says: "This sentence seems to me to be syntactically 
radically defective. There is the predicate 'is identical with', which yields 
a sentence when flanked by singular terms or singular variables. There is 
the predicate 'are identical with', which yields a sentence when flanked by 
plural referring expressions or plural variables. I do not see how there 
could be any sort of "identity" predicate that yielded a sentence by being 
put between a singular term (or variable) and a plural referring expression 
(or variable)" (1990, 287)  5
What, then, are we to make of van Inwagen's claim that we can 
paraphrase 'Some chairs are heavier than some tables' as "There are xs 
that are arranged chairwise and there are ys that are arranged tablewise 
and the xs are heavier than the ys" (1990, 109)? If the xs and the ys are all 
simples, albeit arranged differently, it cannot be that some of them are 
heavier than others. Presumably, all simples weigh the same. For this not 
to be so, some of them would have to have some property such as being 
of a different size, or of different density, than others, properties only 
composites can have. I can see no other way of understanding the last 
clause of the proffered paraphrase than as short for '(some of) the x-wise 
arrangements are heavier than (some of) the y-wise arrangements.' 
But, as already noted, a chairwise arrangement of simples, being a 
composite as much as a chair is, is not something van Inwagen can allow. 
Such an arrangement is, in fact, nothing other than a chair.  6
What gives van Inwagen's proposed paraphrase (and with it, his rejection 
of inanimate composites) plausibility is that 'the planks arranged 
shipwise' un-hyphenated is easily taken to refer to something that, while 
it has all the properties of a ship, is nevertheless not a single thing, hence 
not a ship. But we cannot have it both ways. The referent is either one 
thing – a planks-arranged-ship-wise – or many things – the planks, even 
if, as it happens, arranged ship-wise. If the former, we still have ships. If 
the latter, we lose some truths.  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 Uzquiano argues that the paraphrase strategy cannot handle "apparent plural 5
quantification over composites': "…singular quantification over composites can be 
paraphrased as plural quantification over simples, but plural quantification over composite 
cannot be…". For another interesting discussion of plural reference and plural 
quantification see Yi (2014).
 van Inwagen offers, as an alternative: "There is an x such that x is a set and the members 6
of x are arranged chairwise and there is a y such that y is a set and the members of y are 
arranged tablewise and the members of x are heavier than the members of y" (110). But a 
set of simples arranged chairwise is, surely, a composite, composed of its members, and 
as such should be off limits for van Inwagen. And, again, it is presumably the sets that 
differ in weight, not their respective members. Thus the property of being heavier than is 
a property of some of the sets of xs arranged chairwise – of some of the chairs, as we can 
surely say.
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Consider a simple case where we have only three simples, A,B, and C. 
They may be arranged in six different ways: ABC-wise or ACB-wise, and 
so on. But the property of being arranged in one or the other of these 
ways does not distribute: it does not belong to A, or to B, or to C, any 
more than does the property of being large to the individuals who make 
up a large crowd. Contrast the property of being silent if the crowd is 
silent: each person in the crowd had better be, if 'the crowd is silent' is to 
be true. So with 'the planks are here,' 'the planks are too short' etc. 
distribute: each plank had better be here or be too short. However 'the 
planks are arranged ship-wise' does not distribute. While a hundred 
planks may be arranged ship-wise, no single plank can be so arranged. 
Nor, for van Inwagen, can being arranged ship-wise be a property of an 
aggregate or collection of planks: once we let these in, we can hardly 
avoid thinking of these as being composed of planks in the way van 
Inwagen does not allow putative composites such as ships to be. 
Furthermore, such an aggregate is as much a single thing as is a single 
plank (or a ship), so it cannot be arranged any more than a plank can. 
Suppose that as we proceed with our repairs, each wooden plank is 
replaced by a metal one. Metal planks do not float. To say that they do 
when they are arranged ship-wise is to commit a double mistake. The 
first is to suggest that being arranged distributes, so that each metal plank 
has the property of being arranged ship-wise. The second – even if a 
single plank could have the property of being arranged ship-wise – is to 
think that that property would be sufficient to make it such that it can 
float. Conversely, the planks are a hundred in number, but the ship (a-
hundred-planks-arranged-shipwise) is not. It was the Titanic that was 
thought to be unsinkable; no-one thought that any of the sheets of metal 
which when riveted together made it up were. 
I said earlier that the property of being arranged does not distribute and 
thus cannot be a property of the planks taken severally. Nor, as already 
noted, can it be a property of the set or aggregate of the planks, since it 
makes no sense to say of a single thing, even if that thing is a set or 
aggregate, that it is arranged in a certain way. Only a plurality of things 
can have the property of being arranged. 
It may be suggested that being arranged ship-wise can be a property of 
the planks in something like the way as being arranged in a circle may be 
said to be a property of the chairs in the room. It may seem that here we 
are attributing the property neither to the individual chairs nor to a single 
thing, their collection or set: we are saying neither that any single chair is 
arranged in a circle nor that there is a circular thing the chairs compose 
that is. Indeed, there is no single concrete thing the chairs compose. 
However, not every way simples (or honorary simples) may be arranged 
yields an object of a familiar sort. If the chairs are, in addition to being 
arranged in a circle, attached to each other  —  as is not uncommon with  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rows of chairs in an auditorium – the fact that we have no ready label for 
what we then have does not mean that what we have is not a single 
thing.  And it is not difficult to make up stories about how we could find 7
it useful to recognize it as such and coin a name for it. 
Not only that: when we say that the planks are arranged ship-wise, there 
seems to be no way to express the property we supposedly have without 
mentioning ships.  With our chairs, we have serviceable grammatical 8
paraphrases: we can say that they make a circle – an abstract object – 
even if they compose no recognized circular material object. But no such 
paraphrase is available with our planks: if, being arranged shipwise, they 
make a ship-shape, we have not an abstract object but a ship. 
There are any number of locutions we understand perfectly well that 
resist the kind of paraphrase van Inwagen recommends. We speak of the 
ship's planks, of the ship and its planks, of the ship and the planks that 
compose it, all perfectly fine. By contrast, 'the planks arranged ship-
wise's planks,' 'the planks arranged ship-wise and their (?) planks,' and 
'the planks arranged ship-wise and the planks that compose them (?)' 
resist parsing. Put in the hyphens, and all is well. But now we have our 
ships back. 
Things are equally clear in van Inwagen's leading example of the fort (as 
we say) built of sand by legionnaires. If it is true that the fort is twenty 
feet high and can withstand an attack, it must be true that the grains of 
sand arranged fort-wise are (?) and can. None of the grains of sand (our 
honorary simples here) are or can. So, 'the grains of sand arranged fort-
wise' must be understood as referring to a fort-wise arrangement of grains 
of sand. That thing is twenty feet tall and can withstand an attack. But 
that thing is a fort, even if calling it grains of sand arranged fort-wise 
instead of a grains-of-sand-arranged-fort-wise (or a fort-wise 
arrangement of grains of sand) obscures this. The first four hyphens in 
the latter, and the indefinite (or definite) article they licence, make all the 
difference.  9
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 Even if they are not attached to each other, we may have a single thing if we think of 7
them as, so arranged, constituting an object of interest to us, one, perhaps, with a religious 
significance. Some think that we would then have a scattered object, as in the familiar 
example of a watch disassembled for repair or a pipe for cleaning (e.g., Cartwright 
(1975) and Smart (1973)). For resistance on this, see Biro (2017a).
 Recall Rosenberg's and Elder's complaints.8
 The point is a general one: arrangements have properties that the things arranged lack, 9
and vice versa. This is so even if, unlike in the case of the ship and its planks, it is the 
same property that is in question. At the county fair, your roses may fail to win first prize, 
yet your arrangement of them may do so, or the other way around. The property of being 
the most beautiful at the show may attach to the arrangement or to the things arranged (or, 
of course, to both.)
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Van Inwagen insists that in building (so to speak) a fort or a ship we do 
not bring anything into existence. Just so, if by that is meant that we did 
not add to the world’s stock of simples. But when one says that we have 
brought a fort or a ship into existence one is, obviously, not saying that. 
One is saying that we have made certain propositions true, for example, 
that the world now contains a fort or a ship, something it did not do 
before. It does so because the appropriate (honorary) simples have been 
arranged in the appropriate way, in the shape of a fort or a ship. So 
arranged, they are ship or fort, and there are now truths about forts or 
ships when there were none before. When van Inwagen says that we have 
merely “rearranged the furniture of the earth without adding to” (van 
Inwagen 1990, 124) he is using ‘furniture’ to refer to the simples. Once 
again, we cannot take him to be talking about individual simples, since 
these cannot be rearranged, since they were not – and could not be – 
arranged in any particular way before. A certain number of them must 
have been arranged X-wise if we are to talk of something’s being re-
arranged so that that something is now arranged Y-wise. And if all we 
have to start with are the simples, to arrange a number of them Y-wise is 
to make something, namely, a Y. 
It sometimes happens that the host is one bed short for the guest who 
sensibly prefers not to drive home after the party. Never mind – we can 
push two capacious armchairs together. We have rearranged the furniture 
– this, time literally. Have we made a bed? What matters is not what we 
call what we have made but that there is now something there was not 
before, something for our guest to spend a tolerably comfortable night in. 
Neither of the armchairs (our honorary simples here) was like that before 
the two were pushed together. To say that there is now a bed is just to say 
that there is now something that has a certain property, can serve a certain 
function. For that to be the case, we need not have added to the furniture. 
Of course, we did not do that. There are just as many (honorary) simples 
as there were before, and there is nothing in addition to them. It is they 
that are now a bed. 
According to van Inwagen, what I have claimed are truths about ships, 
forts, beds and mountains are merely apparent truths, truths really about 
simples.  But if we accept the paraphrasability-without-loss criterion, we 10
have to conclude that this cannot be so. If there are even loose-talk truths 
about something that are not reducible to loose-talk truths about anything 
else, that thing exists.  But to say that it does is not to say that the thing 11
is something in addition to the (honorary) simples that compose it; thus to  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 There are, he allows, genuine truths about living things and abstract objects, neither 10
under discussion here.
 This is not to say that the thing is real as opposed to being fictional. The principle holds 11
within fiction, too.
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say that there are composites is not to say that these exist in addition to 
whatever ultimate simples there are. Since there are truths about ships 
distinct from any truths about the planks that compose them, truths about 
composites in general in addition to whatever truths there may be about 
simples, composites, natural or artifactual, exist, and they do so strictly 
speaking. Van Inwagen seems to assume that to hold this is to hold that 
there are such objects in addition to simples. But in arguing that this is 
not so, he is tilting at windmills. 
It may be objected that I have overlooked the fact that, as van Inwagen 
insists, all he needs his paraphrases to capture is what is strictly true, and 
since some of the things we ordinarily say about ships – those that imply 
their existence – are not strictly true, they do not need to be saved. If we 
can say something that is strictly true that captures all the facts without 
saying what we ordinarily say, the "truths" of the latter need not be 
captured by our translation. This may seem plausible with respect to the 
Copernicus example. We know that it is not true, strictly speaking, that 
the sun moved behind the elms. Of course, in everyday discourse we 
continue speaking as before. But we can say what is strictly true by 
replacing the everyday description with one that does not carry the same 
commitments: we can say that the rotation of the earth has brought the 
elms to be between us and the sun. However, no such paraphrase is 
available for ordinary utterances about ships and the like, and no 
scientific discovery can make one available in the way that Copernicus' 
did for what we said about the garden. It is not that we lack some 
knowledge about what ships really are such that if we had it, we would 
no longer need to speak of them. We know that they are composed of 
planks or the like; knowing this, we still have to speak as we ordinarily 
do to say what we want to say of The Queen Mary when we say that it 
weighs 81237 tons. Thus there is an important disanalogy between what 
we are imagining Copernicus as saying and what van Inwagen says about 
ships. With the former, we are told that we were mistaken about the facts. 
The latter merely proposes a new way to describe them. We are, post-
Copernicus, willing to say that the sun did not move, but we are not, post-
van Inwagen, willing to say that the ship has not sailed.  12
While we have reason to say of what we said in the garden that it was not 
strictly true, we have no reason to say this of what we say about The 
Queen Mary's tonnage. So, to say that our paraphrase need not capture it, 
since it is true only in a loose sense is to beg the question. There has to be 
an independent reason for thinking that it is not strictly true, beyond the 
fact that it eludes our favoured paraphrase. 
One reason van Inwagen offers is that if we accepted that the legionnaires 
built a fort by pushing the grains of sand around, we would have to 
accept that whenever we alter the shape of some collection of simples, we  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create a new object. His example is kneading a lump of soft clay absent-
mindedly into "some complicated and arbitrary shape. Call anything 
essentially of that shape a gollyswoggle… [i]f you can make a 
gollyswoggle by accident by kneading clay, then you must, as you idly 
work the clay in your fingers, be causing the generation and corruption of 
the members of a compact series of objects of infinitesimal duration. That 
is what seems to me to be incredible" (van Inwagen 1990, 126). But is it? 
At time t we have an object with shape g, at t1, an object with shape h (call 
it a hollyswoggle), and so on. We have, of course, no interest in such 
objects – though we might have, if, say, we suddenly noticed one and 
found it particularly beautiful or in some other way remarkable. But even 
if this does not happen, there will be a true proposition 'there is a 
gollyswoggle,' at time t, a true proposition 'there is a hollyswoggle' at t1, 
another – 'there is a jollyswoggle' – at t2, and so on. I see nothing puzzling 
in this.  13
van Inwagen also thinks that the only way to avoid the – to him as 
unwelcome as to me – consequence that two things, a statue and a piece 
of clay, can be in the same place, is to say that statues exist no more than 
do gollyswoggles. After all, the shape of the lump of clay that the 
sculptor formed into the statue changes every instant, if only ever so 
slightly and even if not by the sculptor's action but the weather's. So, as 
time passes, we have a succession of statues (let us suppose, to piggy-
back on Gibbard's (1975) well-known example, Goliath at time t, Holiath 
at t1, and so on – perhaps, eventually, no statue). If that means that at 
every instant we have two things, one of the statues and the lump of clay, 
Lumpl (since the latter does not go out of existence with every change of 
shape, as each successive Goliathn is thought to do), we do have a puzzle. 
But that is a different puzzle from the one that puzzles van Inwagen.  14!
52
 While one can stipulate, as van Inwagen does here that every change in the shape of a 13
piece of clay yields a different object, that is not the way we usually think of pieces of 
clay. Arguments for co-incident entities typically turn on the opposite assumption, namely, 
that the piece of clay can survive being deformed, while the statue cannot. Even statues 
are not essentially of the shape they are, as they can survive changes of shape such as 
losing an arm.
 True, the effects of the weather on the statue – erosion or encrustation – change its, and 14
thus Lumpl's, size, as well as shape, so that if we apply Gibbard's mereological 
essentialist definition of a piece (no loss or addition of part) strictly, the piece of clay, 
Lumpl, is as ephemeral as is Goliath. But it is obvious that pieces of clay can tolerate 
small changes, as in fact Gibbard himself allows. (For a different way of shunning 
coincident entities, see Biro 2016 and Biro 2017b.) And, of course, we do not think about 
statues in that way, so that Holiath etc. need not be distinct from Goliath, not even, 
perhaps, when what we have no longer resembles the subject it represents. (Think of the 
many examples of abstract, non-figurative painting or sculpture intended and seen to 
represent without resembling.)
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Denying that composite material objects exist is typically motivated by a 
desire for a sparse ontology and a reluctance to multiply entities beyond 
necessity.  But such Ockhamite goals do not require the eschewing of 15
composites altogether. All one needs to deny is that they exist in addition 
to whatever simples (ultimate or honorary) compose them. When some 
planks are put together in a certain way, they make a ship. There is, 
indeed, nothing where the ship is other than those planks so put together. 
But to insist on this one need not deny that when they are put together in 
that way, there is a ship, even while agreeing that it is nothing over and 
above the planks.  When they are put together in some other way, there 16
may be something else – a house, perhaps, or a pile of planks, which, too, 
are single things. If they are scattered, there is no single material thing 
(though each plank is one). We can hold that ships are not something in 
addition to their planks without agreeing with van Inwagen that there are 
no ships. More generally, we can hold that there are composites, even if 
these are not things in addition to the things that compose them. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 For an example, see Merricks (2001).15
 This is to endorse the strong version of the so-called composition-as-identity thesis, on 16
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